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ity in program provision in terms of the labor market outcomes. We find that in
the presence of downward wage rigidity, forward-looking employers compress
wage increases today because of the uncertainty regarding the level of program
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tions: (i) greater variability in program provision results in a larger compression
of wage increases; and (ii) that compression of wage increases is more severe in
districts where inflation is low relative to where inflation is high. This has im-
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1 Introduction
Employment guarantee schemes have long been a standard response of the government
in its role as an employer of last resort. Starting with the Poor Employment Act of 1817
in Britain (Blaug, 1963, 1964) and the New Deal Programs during the 1930s in the US
(Kesselman, 1978; Bernstein, 1970), large public works have played an increasingly
dominant role in providing income support for the poor in many developing econom-
ies.1 The recent implementation of the largest public workfare program in the world,
the National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) has reignited the debate on
the general equilibrium effects of such large public works programs.2
The recent empirical literature on the labor market impact of NREGA provides
evidence that the program did increase low-skilled private sector wages (Azam, 2012;
Zimmermann, 2012; Berg et al., 2013; Imbert and Papp, 2015; Bahal, 2016).3 Imbert
and Papp further report substantial welfare gains to the poor from this wage increase.
Juxtaposed with this body of work is the literature that highlights partial implement-
ation of public workfare programs in India. Although NREGA guarantees 100 days
of low-skilled employment to every rural household per year, studies have found high
levels of rationing or unmet demand for NREGA work (Dutta et al., 2012; Imbert and
Papp, 2014). Moreover, the level of employment provision has been shown to fluctu-
ate greatly across districts and over time (Drèze and Khera, 2009; Drèze and Oldiges,
2009; Bahal, 2016).
Although many useful lessons have emerged from this recent work, there is a signi-
ficant disconnect between these two strands of literature. Little or no attempt has been
made to understand the consequences of variability in program provision on private
employment and wages. Intuitively, partial program implementation by itself may
already incur substantial losses in terms of unrealized potential gains for (i) the in-
tended program beneficiaries who are rationed out of the workfare, and (ii) the non-
beneficiaries who stand to gain from the consequent increase in low-skilled private
wages. The key question, however, is to understand the impact of variability in pro-
gram provision on market outcomes, especially in labor markets that are often fraught
with distortions like wage rigidities and market power.
Put differently, we ask whether fluctuations in program provision over time dampen
1See Drèze and Sen (1989), Lipton (1996), Subbarao (1997), Keddeman (1998) for discussion of
public works in various countries of Latin America, Asia, and Africa over the last few decades. We use
the terms public works, workfare programs, and employment guarantee schemes interchangeably.
2The program which started in 2006 was implemented in phases and covered all the districts of the
country by 2008. The employment scheme was later renamed to Mahatma Gandhi NREGA.
3Although the impact estimates reported by these studies are fairly heterogeneous (owing primarily
to differences in data and econometric methodologies).
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or compress the wage increase that corresponds to the level of program provision
today. The issue is even more relevant for developing economies where variability
in program provision emanates mostly from limitations in administrative capabilities
and constrained budgets. In the case of India, employment provision (or lack thereof)
has indeed been associated with supply factors like administrative capacity or political
will instead of demand factors like poverty or rate of unemployment (Imbert and Papp,
2015; Bahal, 2016).
To answer this question, we use a model of EGS that accommodates three key
features of (i) imperfect competition and market power, (ii) nominal wage rigidities,
and (iii) uncertainty regarding the level of program provision in the future. First, given
the evidence of market outcomes that support imperfect competition and market power,
we drop the assumption of a perfectly competitive rural labor market (see for e.g.,
Bardhan and Rudra, 1981; Bardhan, 1979, 1984; Binswanger et al., 1984; Datt, 1997).
Second, following the evidence of downward nominal wage rigidity (Kahn, 1997;
Lebow et al., 1999; Knoppik and Beissinger, 2003, 2009; Dickens et al., 2006; Behr
and Pötter, 2010) we restrict nominal wage cuts in our model. Specifically for the
casual daily labor market in India, Drèze and Mukherjee (1989) note “The standard
wage (in money terms) . . . appears to be, more often than not, rigid downwards during
the slack season”. More recently, Kaur (2014) provides evidence of downward rigidity
in nominal wages using wage and employment responses to rainfall shocks. Lastly,
following the empirical literature that provides evidence on partial implementation and
variability in program provision, we study market outcomes in the event rationing in
future is different from its level today.
Using a static model of EGS we first show that public workfare leads to a con-
traction of labor supply for private employment which increases private wages.4 The
level of program provision determines the extent of contraction in private labor sup-
ply and the consequent increase in private wages. Next, to accommodate temporal
variation in program provision we recalculate labor market outcomes in a two-period
model of EGS. Keeping the present level of program provision the same, we compare
wage increases between the static and two-period cases. We find that in comparison
to the static case, wage increase in the two-period framework is lower if the program
provision deteriorates in future. Moreover, we find that the greater is the contraction in
4The fall in private employment associated with EGS implementation is consistent with the empirical
evidence (see for e.g. Imbert and Papp, 2015). Since we incorporate rationing explicitly in our model
and therefore assume EGS wage to be higher than the private wage, market power doesn’t result in cases
where both private wages and employment can increase due to the EGS. See Basu, Chau, and Kanbur
(2009) for a discussion when EGS can raise private employment as well. In that spirit, a workfare is
different from a minimum wage policy where both private employment and wages may increase due to
efficiency gains in a monopsonistic or oligopsonistic labor market.
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program provision in the future (vis-à-vis its level today), the greater is the compres-
sion of wage increases.
The compression of wage increases in the two-period framework follows from (i)
a decline in the program provision in the future which ideally warrants a wage cut and
(ii) the downward nominal wage rigidity which restricts such a reduction in wages.
This apparent trade-off between current and future profit implies that present wages
cannot be solely determined by the level of the program provision today. Instead,
optimal private wage in the current period is based on present and future levels of
program provision. This explains why a decline in program provision in the future
dampens wage increases today. In reality, however, there is uncertainty regarding the
level of program provision in the future. To incorporate this uncertainty, we assume
the rate of rationing in future to be drawn from a given distribution of rationing rates.
The optimal wage in the first period is then based on optimizing current and expected
future profit. We find that greater variability in the level of program provision in the
future is associated with higher compression of wage increases today. Importantly,
greater compression of wage increases is shown to reduce both employer profit and
worker utility.5
Finally, we empirically validate two key predictions of our model: (i) that the in-
crease in private wages due to the workfare is lower when variation in program provi-
sion is high; and (ii) that the compression of wage increases is more severe in districts
where inflation is low relative to where inflation is high. Using district-level expendit-
ure data on employment schemes from Bahal (2016), we find that the increase in (real)
private wages due to the workfare is lower as the variability in program provision in-
creases.6 In support of the second prediction, we find that the compression of wage
increases is significantly higher for low inflation districts relative to high inflation dis-
tricts. These results have important policy implications as they suggest that by simply
reducing the variability in program provision, without necessarily increasing the aver-
age program expenditure, can be welfare enhancing.
Our results contribute to the literature in three important ways. First, we supple-
ment the general literature that studies compression of wage increases due to down-
ward nominal wage rigidity (Elsby, 2009; Stüber and Beissinger, 2010). These studies
model wage rigidity through a loss in worker productivity following a downward re-
vision in nominal wages. In their model, firms compress wage increases today if they
anticipate future wage cuts that may prove costly to implement. We share the same
5We assume risk neutral preferences for both employers and workers. Incorporating risk averse
preferences will only exacerbate the loss in utility associated with the variability in program provision.
6We address the usual concerns regarding endogeneity. We use standard deviation in program ex-
penditure as a measure of variability in program provision.
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insight as these studies except that our objective is to associate the compression of
wage increases with the need to cut wages in the future due to a decline in program
provision; downward nominal wage rigidity is assumed in our model. A similar frame-
work can be used to assess other policy interventions that affect labor market outcomes
under downward nominal wage rigidity.
Second, we contribute to the recent theoretical literature on employment guarantee
schemes by explicitly incorporating (i) partial implementation of the workfare and
(ii) temporal variability in program provision. While Basu et al. (2009) and Imbert
and Papp (2015) acknowledge rationing, their comparative static framework does not
allow for a discussion on market outcomes due to the temporal variability in rationing
and the ensuing uncertainty.7 On the other hand, studies like Basu (2013) and Bahal
(2016) discuss labor market outcomes under a productive EGS in a framework with
more than one period. However, since both the studies assume complete program
implementation, there is no role for variability in program provision.
Finally, our study highlights the need to better understand the role of expectations
in determining the labor market effects of large employment guarantees. If the con-
tinued existence of a workfare alleviates uncertainty regarding the level of program
provision, then part of the increase in wages should simply be due to the accompany-
ing decompression of wage increases. This may be a relevant factor that explains why
recent empirical studies have found negligible contemporaneous impact of NREGA on
wages in contrast to a sizeable impact over time (Berg et al., 2013; Shrivastava, 2015;
Bahal, 2016).
The next section discusses some empirical regularities regarding recent employ-
ment guarantee programs and rural labor markets in India. Section 3.3 and 3.4 respect-
ively discuss the model and the welfare implications of a variable and inconsistent
employment guarantee. Section 3.5 tests the key empirical predictions of the model.
Section 3.6 concludes.
2 Descriptive Evidence
This section discusses the key empirical regularities regarding employment guarantee
schemes and nominal agricultural wage changes in India. We first present evidence that
work under NREGA is rationed. Next, we discuss temporal variation in the level of
program provision to highlight that employment provision is susceptible to deteriorate
in the future. This evidence is important as a decline in program provision in the future
7Basu, Chau, and Kanbur (2009) for example take the choice of location and the ease off access as
an implicit rationing device by the government.
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represents the need for future wage cuts in order to partly reverse the increase in wages
today. In the presence of downward nominal wage rigidity, this ultimately leads to the
compression of wage increases.
We further show that the level of program provision today is not very informat-
ive of the level of program provision in the future. This underscores the uncertainty
associated with a variable and inconsistent program. Finally, we present evidence of
downward nominal wage rigidity in rural labor markets in India. Together with these
empirical regularities, we develop our theory in the next section which is later subject
to empirical validation that completes the paper.
2.1 Rationing in Employment Guarantee Schemes
Although NREGA guarantees 100 days of low-skilled manual labor work to every rural
household, work under NREGA is substantially rationed. Using evidence from the
nationally representative National Sample Survey (NSS), Dutta et al. (2012) estimate
rationing rates – defined as the proportion of workers who demand but do not get
work under NREGA – for all the states of the country. Figure 1 shows the rationing
rates across Indian states calculated using estimates from Dutta et al. (2012). As the
figure shows, while there is significant variation across states, rationing for work under
NREGA is substantial with the rationing rate of ≈ 44% at the national level.
Figure 1: Rationing rates in NREGA across Indian states
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Using data from a RICE survey conducted for 70 villages in Gujarat, Rajasthan,
and Madhya Pradesh, Imbert and Papp (2014) also note that “households with at least
one member employed under the act . . . report a mean of only 38 days of work . . . well
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below the guaranteed 100 days”. Moreover, not all the demand for work is even docu-
mented. As a World Bank study notes, many job card holders do not actively demand
for work and instead passively wait for work to be provided (The World Bank, 2011).
Overall, there is conclusive evidence that demand for work under such employment
schemes is rationed. In fact, rationing excess demand for work may be inevitable un-
der such large programs if the government does not have a lot of flexibility in changing
the wage rates.
If wages are fixed at socially acceptable level and the budget for employment guar-
antees is limited, then the amount of employment provided under the EGS has to be
adjusted accordingly. However, since both supply and demand of EGS work determine
the level of program provision, it is important to know whether differences in program
provision are due to the differences in the demand for EGS work. The evidence from
recent studies, however, suggests that variation in employment provision is mostly due
to supply factors like administrative capabilities and not from demand factors like local
economic conditions or the level of poverty.
Imbert and Papp (2014) for example show that a host of district and worker level
characteristics are unable to account for the stark differences in the level of employ-
ment provision across districts.8 Similarly, Dutta et al. (2012) find the number of
NREGA days provided to be only weakly correlated with the level of poverty. Hence,
there is evidence to support that fluctuations in program provision are mostly supply
driven like bureaucratic idiosyncrasies, political will, or experience in managing sim-
ilar programs in the past.
2.2 Inconsistent and Variable Employment Guarantee
In this section, we show that the program provision in the future can deteriorate vis-
à-vis its level today. The existence of such temporal variability in program provision
is important since the compression of wage increases in our model is associated with
the need to cut (downwardly rigid) wages in the future because of a decline in program
provision. Using employment expenditure data from Bahal (2016), we use the funds
made available at the start of each fiscal year as a measure of the level of program
provision.9 Figure 2 shows the distribution of year-on-year growth of funds made
available for two recent employment guarantee schemes in India at the district level
from 2001-2010.
8Their district controls include for e.g., the rate of literacy, poverty rate, agricultural productivity, the
level of wages, local elections, etc. Worker controls include age, sex, education, marital status, etc.
9Given that program provision is largely noted to be supply driven, funds made available at the start
of a fiscal year are a good indicator of the intended level of program provision at the district level.
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Figure 2: Distribution of Fund Allocation Changes
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The graph shows the distribution of year-on-year percentage change in real per capita fund allocation
made under SGRY and NREGA. The unit of observation is a district-year. Data is for 442 districts from
2001-2010 (4420 observations). Fund allocation changes are top coded at 300%.
As can be seen, there are substantial fluctuations in fund allocation growth. While
the distribution is skewed towards the right with an average of 16% growth, a standard
deviation of 50% indicates a sizeable probability with which program provision may
decline in the future. This is reaffirmed from the substantial mass of the distribution
that lies to the left of zero.10 Hence, the program provision in all likelihood may
deteriorate in the future vis-à-vis its level today.
Further, there is a high level of uncertainty associated with forecasting the level of
program provision in the future. We expand on this by employing actual program ex-
penditure data at the district level for 10 years from Bahal (2016). Figure 3 highlights
the uncertainty involved in predicting the future level of program expenditure based on
the current expenditure levels. The figure plots the lead versus the current program ex-
penditure (in logs) for 109 districts of four major states of India. As can be seen, actual
expenditure in the future can be substantially higher or lower than the predicted 95%
confidence interval obtained from a linear regression of future expenditure ln(ei,t+1)
on current expenditure ln(ei,t).11 We use this evidence to introduce uncertainty in our
10More than one-third of the observations correspond to a negative growth in fund allocation. There
is considerable heterogeneity in the probability of a decline in fund allocation across states, from just
15% for Andhra Pradesh to nearly 50% for Haryana.
11The regression also controls for district and year fixed effects along with a binary variable INREGA
which indicates whether or not NREGA was implemented in a district by year t.
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Figure 3: Predicted versus actual expenditure using past expenditure
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model later in the next section.
2.3 Downward Nominal Wage Rigidity
Finally, our assumption of downward nominal wage rigidity follows from the evid-
ence presented in Kaur (2014) regarding year-on-year changes in nominal agricultural
wages in India. Figure 4 (from Kaur, 2014) shows nominal wage changes for 256
districts over a period of 30 years.
The distribution of wage changes exhibits large clustering at zero and a discon-
tinuous drop to the left of zero. This may be indicative of potential wage cuts that
did not materialize due to downward rigidities.12 Kaur further concludes that while
positive rainfall shocks increase nominal wages, negative shocks do not result in wage
cuts. Such asymmetric wage adjustment to labor demand shocks is consistent with
downward rigidities.13
12A large cluster at nominal zero changes is not expected under a continuous distribution of shocks
(McLaughlin 1994, Kahn 1997). In contrast, Kaur (2014) shows the distribution of real agricultural
wage changes to be symmetric around zero.
13Survey evidence from Kaur further suggests that nominal wage cuts are regarded as unfair by agri-
cultural workers and employers.
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Figure 4: Changes in nominal wages
Source: Kaur (2014). The figure shows the histogram of year-on-year percentage changes in nom-
inal agricultural wages for 256 districts from 1956-1987 (7,680 observations) taken from World Bank
Climate and Agriculture dataset. Wage changes are top coded at 50% and bottom coded at −50%.
3 Model
We construct a model of the labor market at the village level. We assume labor to be
of measure 1. Wage from private employment is w. The cost of working c is distrib-
uted uniformly over the interval [0,C]. This cost includes the cost of effort and other
costs such as the opportunity cost of not migrating. The utility of private employment
is given by u = w− c. We normalize reservation utility as 0. For those who are em-
ployed, u≥ 0, which implies c≤w. Labor supply in the village is given by the fraction
of people who are willing to work in private employment at wage w: l = w/C. Hence,
the inverse labor supply is given by w(l) =Cl. Below we make our first assumption.
Assumption 1. Employers have market power.
Even with perfect competition, it is possible that the wage increases due to an
EGS are compressed. This is because wages may already be higher than the current
competitive level due to business cycle fluctuations and downward wage rigidity. As
Elsby (2009) notes “. . . even in the absence of forward-looking behavior, downward
wage rigidity raises the level of wages that firms inherit from the past. As a result,
firms do not have to raise wages as often or as much to obtain their desired wage
level.” However, following the literature on agricultural labor markets in India, perfect
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competition may be a strong assumption .14 Further, under perfect competition, the
introduction of a more intense public employment program like NREGA should result
in an immediate increase in wages.15
However, the recent empirical literature on NREGA (see for e.g., Berg et al., 2013;
Shrivastava, 2015; Bahal, 2016) does not find any immediate adjustment of wages due
to the introduction of NREGA. This too is evidence against perfectly competitive agri-
cultural labor markets in India. Therefore, we assume employers to have some degree
of market power. For the ease of algebra, we assume a monopsonistic labor market
structure. However, our results do not depend on the degree of imperfect competition.
We show in the Appendix that our results are also valid under oligopsony.
We model the agricultural production function as increasing and concave in l. For
ease of calculation, we use a quadratic function. The profit of the employer is given by
pi = a(l− l2/2)−wl = a(l− l2/2)−Cl2
where a signifies labor productivity. The employer chooses the optimum amount
of labor to maximize its profit. We can use the first order condition to get this optimum
level, which will be the equilibrium level of employment and which will also give us
the equilibrium wage.
l∗0 =
a
a+2C
w∗0 =
aC
a+2C
As expected, both employment and wage increase with productivity a. On the other
hand, wage increases while employment decreases with cost C.
3.1 EGS
Now we introduce an EGS into the model. We assume that the government, under the
EGS, offers a wage wg. The wage is set at a socially acceptable level that is higher than
the prevailing market wage w∗0 and the government cannot change it.
16 This implies
14For example, Bardhan (1984) notes: “. . . in about 45 percent of our sample villages (in West Bengal)
7 or fewer employers account for most of the casual labor employment in the village . . . In many villages
there is open or tacit collusion of big employers in the labor market” (p.60).
15In a competitive setting, large employment schemes can increase private wages in order to clear
the labor supply and demand (Imbert and Papp, 2015). Even in a multi-period environment, there will
still be a complete upward adjustment of wages since the benefit of raising wages now outweigh the
expected decline in future profits (Kaur, 2014).
16Having an EGS wage lower than the prevailing market wage in our model would render the EGS
completely ineffective as it will be unable to attract any workers. In practice, the EGS wage is linked
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that everyone employed at wage w∗0, as well as some of those not employed would
want to work in the EGS at the higher wage wg.
Let e0 be the expenditure required to employ everyone who wants a job under the
EGS. We assume that the actual budget e is lower than this and hence everyone cannot
be employed. The people who do not get employed in the EGS despite wanting to
work in it are said to be rationed out and the rate of rationing is given by
r = 1− e
e0
As mentioned earlier, the rate of rationing is around 40% for India on average
(Dutta et al., 2012), justifying the assumption that e < e0.
We assume that the government randomly selects the people who do get employed
in the EGS. This means that for the workers wanting to work in the EGS, the cost of
working c is not correlated with the probability of getting to work in the EGS (we show
in the Appendix that relaxing this assumption does not change the results).
The new labor supply for private employment consists of two parts. For the private
wage w less than the EGS wage wg, all the people working in private employment at
this wage when there was no EGS will now want to work in the EGS. However, a
fraction r of them will be rationed out and they will form the labor supply for private
employment. For w > wg, everyone will want to work in the higher paying private
employment and the situation will be the same as when there was no EGS.
l =

wr
C
i f w≤ wg
w
C
i f w > wg
This is shown graphically in Figure 5, which depicts the discontinuity in the labor
supply at w = wg.
Hence, the new inverse labor supply is given by
w(l) =

Cl
r
i f w≤ wg
Cl i f w > wg
Using the F.O.C. of the employer’s optimization problem, we get the equilibrium
private sector employment and wage.
l∗1 = min
{
ar
ar+2C
,
wgr
C
}
< l∗0
to the statutory minimum wage, which is generally much higher than the actual wages being paid, and
which the government does not have too much flexibility in changing.
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Figure 5: Labor supply for private employment when there is an EGS with wage wg
Note: The upward sloping dashed line represents the labor supply when there is no EGS. The solid
line is the labor supply for private employment when there is an EGS with the EGS wage being 70 and
rationing rate 0.6. The labor supply only includes the workers being rationed out of the EGS as long
as the private wage is below the EGS wage. When the private wage exceeds the EGS wage, the labor
supply reverts to the original case as workers no longer prefer working in the EGS.
w∗1 = min
{
aC
ar+2C
,wg
}
> w∗0
This shows that wage increases and private employment decreases as the EGS is
implemented. Overall employment will increase as the EGS employs all the people
who left private employment and also some people who were not previously employed
in the private sector. We can also see that in the case where w∗1 < wg,
dw∗1
dr
< 0 , which
implies
dw∗1
de
> 0. Hence, ceteris paribus, as the government expenditure increases,
rationing decreases and the wage in the private sector increases. In the case where
w∗1 = wg, any further expenditure on the EGS will be ineffective as it will only shift
employment from the private sector to the EGS without causing any change to total
employment.
For simplifying the rest of the analysis, we will assume that the EGS wage wg is
higher than the maximum possible value of the optimal private wage w∗1, i.e. wg ≥a
2
. Since the EGS wage is fixed and the analysis does not seek to find the impact of
changes in the EGS wage on the private wage, relaxing this assumption will not affect
the results obtained. Hence, we can now write the optimal private wage and private
employment in the simplified form.
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l∗1 =
ar
ar+2C
< l∗0
w∗1 =
aC
ar+2C
> w∗0
(1)
3.2 Two-period Model
Now we move from a static model to a two-period model of the labor market with an
EGS. As we have shown earlier, rationing rates vary a lot within a district. Hence the
rationing rates in the two periods are likely to be different. Let the employer observe
the rationing in the first period, t. Let us assume for now that the employer is naive
and sets the wage in the first period at the statically optimum level described in the
previous section. In the second period, t +1, if the rationing rate is lower than that in
the first period, then the labor supply would decrease and the optimum wage would be
higher than that in the first period. Conversely, if the rate of rationing increases then the
optimum wage would be lower. Here we introduce the downward rigidity constraint
on wages.
Assumption 2. Private wages are downwardly rigid i.e. wages cannot decrease from
period 1 to 2.
We have discussed the supporting evidence for this earlier with Kaur (2014). We
are simplifying the treatment of downward rigidity in two ways. First, we are consid-
ering perfect rigidity, i.e. we are, by construction, preventing wages from decreasing.
In a more complex model, one could introduce a cost of wage reduction, for example,
reduced productivity because of perceived unfairness. Here we abstract from this by
assuming that such costs are large enough to prevent any downward revision of wages.
Secondly, we are abstracting away from price changes and differences between real
and nominal wage changes. We will show later that our results will continue to hold,
albeit more weakly, in the case of price inflation.
Now the naive employer, having set the first-period wage at the statically optimum
level, observes the rationing rate in the second period and then tries to optimize given
the rigidity constraint. Figure 6 shows how the employment and wage in period t +1
change with the rationing rate rt+1, when there is no rigidity and when there is rigidity.
The graphs on the left show the “no rigidity” case. As rt+1 increases, the EGS
employment decreases linearly. The private employment increases and private wage
decreases as given by the expressions for l∗1 and w
∗
1, the optimal employment and wage
in the static case. The graphs on the right show the case with downward wage rigidity,
with rationing in the first period rt = 0.4. Here, the private employment increases and
14
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private wage decreases as before till rt+1 = 0.4. At this point, the wage wt+1 equals
the wage in period t and any further increase in rt+1 will mean that the wage cannot
be further reduced to an optimal level and will be stuck at the first-period wage wt .
As the rationing rate increases and rt+1 > rt , more workers are rationed out of the
EGS. Some of these workers whose costs are low enough are employed by the private
employer. Hence, private employment increases linearly. As rt+1 keeps increasing it is
possible that the number of workers rationed out of the EGS is higher than the optimal
labor requirement of the private employer with the wage fixed at wt . Let this value of
rt+1 where the labor supply is equal to the optimal labor requirement for the employer,
i.e. where marginal productivity equals wage, be r¯t+1. After this point, the private
employment no longer increases although the EGS employment keeps decreasing.
Now we consider the case of the sophisticated employer who takes into account
the wage rigidity and the variability of rationing rates and hence optimizes over two
periods rather than just one. Let us first assume that the employer knows in advance
what the rationing rate is going to be in the second period. In the next subsection, we
will consider the more realistic case where the employer is uncertain about future rates
of rationing. In the present case, the employer maximizes the sum of the profits in the
two periods.
Π= a(lt− l
2
t
2
)−wt lt +a(lt+1−
l2t+1
2
)−wt+1lt+1
The profit maximization is done under the rigidity constraint: wt ≤ wt+1. The op-
timal value of wt will depend on rt+1. If rt+1≤ rt , then the constraint will not bind, and
wt will be given by the expression for static wage w∗1 given in Equation 1. If rt+1 > rt ,
then the constraint will bind and the second-period wage will no longer be able to be
set optimally. There will be a trade-off between profits in the two periods and the op-
timal wt in the two-period case will be lower than the corresponding value of w∗1 for
the single period case.
Proposition 1. The optimal wage in the first period w∗t will depend on the value of rt+1
in comparison with rt . For a given value of rt , rt+1 can lie in one of three ranges 17:
1. For rt+1 ≤ rt ,
w∗t =
aC
art +2C
= w∗1
17We show in the appendix that when both rt and rt+1 are known, then r¯t+1 =
rt(art +C)
(art −C) . Note that
the third range will only arise for values of rt ∈ [0,1] that are such that 0≤ rt(art +C)
(art −C) ≤ 1.
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2. For rt < rt+1 ≤ r¯t+1,
w∗t =
aC
aφ(rt ,rt+1)+2C
< w∗1
Where,18 φ(rt ,rt+1) =
r2t+1+ r
2
t
rt+1+ rt
> rt for rt < rt+1
3. rt+1 > r¯t+1,
w∗t =
aC
aφ(rt , r¯t+1)+2C
< w∗1
The proof is given in the Appendix. Note that the optimal private employment l∗t
will change proportionally to w∗t and will hence be lower than the statically optimum
value in the second and third ranges.
Figure 7: Wage in the three ranges showing compression of wage increases
Note: The graph shows the increase in private wage due to the EGS in the static case as the gap between
the optimal wages in the ’No EGS’ and the static models. The solid line representing the optimal wage
in the two-period model shows how this wage increase gets compressed once the rationing rate in the
second period exceeds that in the first period, which is assumed to be 0.5 here. Further, it shows that the
optimal wage in the two-period model stops declining with the rationing rate after a threshold where it
enters the third range.
Figure 7 illustrates the three cases. The horizontal axis is rt+1 and the vertical axis
is w∗t . The optimal wage in the absence of an EGS, w∗0, is also shown for compar-
ison. The graph is drawn for rt = 0.5. For rt+1 ≤ rt , we are in range 1 and the wage
increase is highest. For rt+1 > rt we enter range 2 where the increase in wage gets
compressed and the compression increases as rt+1 increases. For even higher values
of rt+1 we enter range 3. The wage increase does not get compressed any further and
w∗t is constant at its minimum value.
18We also see that φ(rt ,rt+1)< 1. Hence, w∗t > w∗0 =
aC
a+2C
17
In the analysis above we have abstracted away from price changes. The empirical
observations are regarding downward rigidity in nominal wages. Hence if there is
price inflation, the rigidity condition will change. Let all the variables above signify
real values. Let the price level in the first period be 1 and that in the second period
be 1 < p < (a+ 2C)/(art + 2C). The rigidity condition would now be wt ≤ pwt+1.
The only difference this would make in the analysis above is to change the bounds of
the three ranges. Range 1 would be larger, rt+1 ≤ prt + 2C(p− 1)/a while ranges 2
and 3 would be smaller at rt+1 > prt +2C(p−1)/a. Hence, the results that we obtain
assuming zero inflation would still be qualitatively valid with price inflation.
3.3 Uncertainty
Up to now we have assumed that the employer has perfect information about the rate
of rationing in the next period. In reality, however, there is uncertainty associated with
forecasting the level of program provision in the future (see Figure 3). Therefore, we
make the following assumption.
Assumption 3. There is uncertainty about future rates of rationing.
Introducing uncertainty in the two-period model implies that there is always a prob-
ability that the rate of rationing may be higher in the future. We will show that this
uncertainty leads to a reduction in the optimal wage compared to the case when the
rationing rate is fixed.
Lemma 1. There is a decrease in the optimal wage in the first period, w∗t , when we
move from the case when it is known with certainty that rationing is going to be the
same in both periods i.e. rt = rt+1, to a case where there is uncertainty such that there
is a chance that rationing may go up, i.e. P[rt+1 > rt ]> 0.
We show the proof in the Appendix but the intuition is evident. As soon as there is
a small probability that the optimal wage in the second period is going to be lower, the
nominal rigidity constraint binds and the statically optimal wage in the first period is
no longer optimal for both periods. The new optimal wage would be lower, trading off
some reduction in profit in the first period with increased profit in the second period.
Lemma 1 deals with the extensive margin of uncertainty, i.e. what happens when
we move from certainty to uncertainty. Now we look at the intensive margin, i.e. what
happens when uncertainty increases. To do this we need to define what we mean by
more uncertainty.
When there is uncertainty about future rationing, the optimization by the employer
will be done based on expectations about future rationing. Let the employer believe
18
that the rationing rate is drawn from a distribution. We can think of uncertainty as the
variance of this distribution. A distribution with zero variance would imply a fixed
rationing rate and would correspond to certainty as discussed earlier. As the variance
increases the uncertainty about future rationing increases. Let us assume for simplicity
that r is uniformly distribution with the support 2x, given by U [m− x,m+ x], where
m is the mean of the distribution. Increasing x increases variance while preserving the
mean, hence we can use x as a measure of uncertainty. We want to see how an increase
in x changes the optimal wage.
The employer maximizes the current profit and the expected future profit given by
Π= a(lt− l
2
t
2
)−wt lt +E[a(lt+1−
l2t+1
2
)−wt+1lt+1]
To calculate the expectation, we will need to divide the distribution of rt+1 into
three parts corresponding to the three ranges listed in the previous subsection. The first
section is where wt+1 ≥ wt and it extends from m− x to the point where wt = wt+1.
Let this value of rt+1 be r′(wt). 19 The second section extends from r′(wt) to a point
where wage equals marginal productivity. Let this point be rt+1 = r′′(wt). 20 The third
section extends from r′′(wt) to m+ x. Hence the expression for the sum of current and
expected profit is
Π(wt ,rt ,m,x) = pi(wt , l(wt ,rt))+
1
2x
(
r′(wt)∫
m−x
pi(w∗t+1, l(w
∗
t+1,r1))dr1
+
r′′(wt)∫
r′(wt)
pi(wt , l(wt ,r2))dr2+
m+x∫
r′′(wt)
pi(wt , lmax(wt))dr3)
Where,
pi{w, l} = a(l− l
2
2
)−wl
l(w,r) =
wr
C
w∗t+1 =
aC
ar1+2C
lmax(w) =
a−w
a
The profit maximizing value of wt will be a function of rt , m and x. Figure 8 shows
19The expression for r′(wt) is obtained using wt = wt+1 =
ac
ar′+2c
.
20r′′(wt) is given by wage equals marginal productivity wt = a(1− lt+1) = a(1− wtr
′′
c
).
19
how the dynamically optimal wage obtained by maximizing the expression above, as
well as the statically optimal value given by the expression for w∗1 in Equation 1 varies
with rt . Hence, the compression of the wage increase, represented by the difference
between the statically and dynamically optimal wages is different for different values
of rt . The compression is high for low values of rt as the probability of rt+1 > rt is
higher, and vice versa.
Figure 8: Variation of statically and dynamically optimum wages in period t with
rationing rate in period t
Note: The optimal values have been numerically computed for a uniform distribution over [0,1], i.e. for
m= 0.5 and x= 0.5. The statically optimal wage is given by the formula in Equation 1, and the dynam-
ically optimal wage is obtained by numerically locating the value of wt that maximizes Π(wt ,rt ,m,x)
We want to show that the dynamically optimal wage, w∗t (rt ,m,x), decreases with
an increase in variance represented by an increase in x. Since the algebra is quite com-
plicated, we provide the analytical solution for a special case, when rationing rate in
the first period is the mean of the distribution, i.e. rt = m.
Proposition 2. The profit maximizing value of the wage at the mean of the distribution
of r, expressed as w∗t |rt=m decreases with an increase in variance represented by an
increase in x, i.e.
dw∗t |rt=m
dx
< 0.
We show the proof in the Appendix using the implicit function theorem.
When we think about the welfare implications of a change in uncertainty, we would
be concerned about the average change in wage across the entire distribution of r rather
than just at the mean. To show a result similar to Proposition 2 for the average wage
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across the distribution, we conducted simulations using different values of the paramet-
ers. The average wage is obtained by integrating the optimal wage w∗t (rt ,m,x) over the
uniform distribution [m− x,m+ x]. This average wage is now only a function of m
and x. The simulations were used to compute this average optimal wage for different
distributions with m fixed at 0.5 but changing values of x. Figure 9 shows the results
of the simulations for three cases, C < a, C = a, and C > a. We find that the average
optimal wage (dynamic) obtained from maximizing Π, the sum of current and expec-
ted future profits, is always lower than the average optimal wage (static) obtained by
maximizing just the current profit. More importantly, we also find that this difference
increases with an increase in variance signified by an increase in x.
Figure 9: Graph showing increase in wage compression with increase in variance
Note: The horizontal axis shows the standard deviation, which is equal to x/
√
3, of the uniform dis-
tribution with mean m = 0.5. The vertical axis is the difference between the statically optimal and
dynamically optimal wages averaged over the entire distribution of rt under an EGS.
This result further strengthens our intuition that increasing uncertainty will lead to
increased compression of the wage increases due to the EGS. This is an important res-
ult as the government’s average expenditure is directly correlated with mean rationing
rate - higher average expenditure will imply lower mean rationing. But the variance
of rationing is related to the variance of expenditure (keeping the EGS wage constant).
Our results hence suggest that by simply lowering the variability in the provision of
public employment while keeping the average expenditure constant, the government
can achieve higher private wages and employment.
21
4 Welfare
We now look at how the compression in the wage increase impacts welfare. The social
welfare function consists of three main components representing the utility of the em-
ployer, the utility of the workers, and the cost of the program. Additionally, we would
also like to incorporate the social planner’s distributional preference over the relative
importance of the utilities of the employer and the workers. This can be done in two
ways. One is to attach weights directly to the utilities of the employer and the workers.
The other way, as used by Basu, Chau, and Kanbur (2009), is to not weight the utilities
but have an additional weighted component representing employment, to account for
the social planner’s concern with increasing employment using an EGS. The results
shown in this section would be valid for either formulation of social welfare but we
follow Basu, Chau, and Kanbur (2009) as the implementation of an EGS by a gov-
ernment indicates its interest in increasing employment. We define the social welfare
function as consisting of the following parts
1. The utility (profit) of the employer (pi)
2. The utility of the workers (W )
3. The benefit of increasing employment (ηE)
4. The cost of implementing the program (µB)
Note that as we are using risk neutral utility functions, all four parts can be directly
interpreted in money terms.
SW = pi+W −µB+ηE
where, E =(lp+ lg); lp and lg are fractions of the labor pool employed in the private
sector and the EGS respectively,
η > 0 signifies the marginal social benefit of employment in addition to the direct
benefit through the workers’ utility,
B = wglg is the money spent on wages paid in the EGS,
µ > 1 is a multiplier that incorporates as a proportion of the wage bill, the adminis-
trative cost of running the EGS, as well as the marginal cost of public funds to account
for distortionary taxation.
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4.1 No EGS Case
In this case, we first compute the expressions for the employer’s profit and for the
workers’ utility using the expressions for equilibrium wage and employment derived
earlier.
Profit is
pi0 = a(lp− l2p/2)−wlp =
a2
2(a+2C)
Workers’ utility is
W0 =
lp∫
0
(w− c) dx
We integrate the employed worker’s utility over the range 0 to lp. The assumption
is that the utility of the workers not working in either the private sector or the EGS
is 0. Since the cost c is uniformly distributed over [0,C], we can write c = xC. Thus
integrating we get
W0 = wlp−
Cl2p
2
=
a2C
2(a+2C)2
The benefit from employment is
ηE0 = η lp =
ηa
a+2C
Social welfare is the sum of pi0, W0 and ηE0. As there is no EGS the cost µB is
zero.
4.2 EGS with Fixed Rationing Rate
With the rationing rate being fixed, there is no uncertainty and employers optimize
statically. We assume that the rationing rate is r and that the EGS wage is set at wg >w.
The profit pi1 expectedly reduces as the labor supply gets lowered by the EGS leading
to an increase in wage and a decrease in private employment.
pi1 = a(lp− l2p/2)−wlp
=
a2r
2(ar+2C)
< pi0
For the workers, since the current private wage as well as the EGS wage are higher
than the private wage in the no-EGS case, and the total employment is higher, it is evid-
ent that their utility will increase with the introduction of EGS. Formally, the workers’
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utility will have two components, one for workers working in the private sector at wage
w and the other for workers working in the EGS at wage wg.
W1 =
lp∫
0
(w− cx) dx+
lg∫
0
(wg− cy) dy
We know that all the workers working in the private sector would want to work in
the EGS but are rationed out. Hence out of all the workers with cost c < w, a fraction r
would be working in the private sector. Hence, cx =
xC
r
. Similarly, out of all workers
with cost c < wg, a fraction (1− r) would be working in the EGS. Hence, cy = yC1− r .
Integrating, we get
W1 = wlp−
Cl2p
2r
+wglg−
Cl2g
2(1− r)
The employment in private sector and in EGS are given by
lp =
wr
C
; lg =
wg(1− r)
C
Using the expression for optimal wage under EGS we get,
W1 =
a2Cr
2(ar+2C)2
+
w2g(1− r)
2C
We can show that when wg = w,
W1 =
a2C
2(ar+2C)2
>W0
Therefore, ∀ wg ≥ w, W1 >W0.
The benefit from employment is
ηE1 = η(lp+ lg) = η
(
ar
ar+2C
+
wg(1− r)
C
)
We can again show that for wg ≥ w, E1 > E0.
The cost of providing the EGS is
µB1 = µwglg =
µw2g(1− r)
C
Hence, the introduction of EGS reduces welfare through lower employer profit and
increased cost to the government, and increases welfare through increased worker util-
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ity and increased employment. Whether this increases or decreases the total welfare
SW1 depends on the values of the two parameters µ and η , which depict the ineffi-
ciency of the government and the social weight attached to achieving higher employ-
ment.
4.3 EGS with Uncertainty
With uncertainty, the employer no longer knows the future level of rationing. Instead,
the current optimal wage is based on a distribution of probable future rationing rates.
For comparison with the previous case, we assume that the distribution has the same
mean rationing rate and it represents an increase of variance from zero. We have
shown that uncertainty leads to the compression of the wage increase possible under
certainty,21 and also that the compression is higher with increased uncertainty. To see
how this compression affects welfare, we check how the components of the welfare
function as derived for an EGS with a fixed rationing rate respond to a reduction in the
wage. The expressions for an EGS with and without uncertainty are comparable as the
labor supply function remains the same
(
l =
wr
C
)
and we can compare the two for the
same level of rationing.
First, let us consider profit. Compared to the case with a fixed rationing rate, both
wage and private employment are reduced. Hence, it is not obvious if the employer’s
profit will increase or decrease.
pi2 = a(lp− l2p/2)−wlp
= a(
wr
C
− w
2r2
2C2
)− w
2r
C
We can show that
dpi2
dw
> 0, when w is less than the optimal static wage w∗1, which
is always the case according to Lemma 1. Hence, the employer’s profit with EGS
under uncertainty pi2 is always lower than that under certainty pi1. This is because the
reduction in production due to a reduction in employment is not offset by the reduction
in wages. This is expected since wage is always less than the marginal product of labor
when employers have market power.
For the workers, it is obvious that the utility will reduce as both wage and employ-
ment are declining.
W2 =
w2r
2C
+
w2g(1− r)
2C
21By ‘certainty’ here we imply fixed rationing rates since if rationing rates are not fixed then uncer-
tainty about the future is inevitable.
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We can again show that
dW2
dw
> 0 when w < w∗1. Hence, W2 <W1.
The cost µB will remain the same for the same EGS wage wg and the same actual
level of rationing r. The benefit from employment will decrease because of lower
private employment lp. Hence, regardless of the values of the parameters µ and η ,
uncertainty will lead to loss of welfare i.e SW2 < SW1.
Furthermore, we can use the simulation results presented in Section 3.3 to extend
the analysis done above and state that an increase in uncertainty, represented by an
increase in the variance of the distribution of r, reduces welfare as it reduces both
private wage and private employment. Hence, the government can improve welfare by
reducing the variation of EGS expenditure, without changing the average expenditure.
5 Testing the Theory
The theory generates two testable predictions: (i) that average positive marginal effect
of the workfare on private wages should be lower when variation in program provision
is high; and (ii) that the compression of wage increases should be more severe when
inflation is low relative to when inflation is high. The first prediction follows from
section 3.3 where we show that greater variability in program provision results in a
larger compression of wage increases (Figure 9). Next, even though we abstract from
price changes in our model, it is straightforward to see that price inflation makes the
constraint of downward nominal wage rigidity less restrictive. This is so since relative
to the constant price assumption, price inflation alleviates the need for future wage
cuts (due to a decline in program provision) resulting in a smaller compression of
wage increases today.
To empirically validate the predictions of the model, we use district-level expendit-
ure data from 2001-2010 for two large public workfare programs in India: SGRY and
NREGA as used in Bahal (2016).22 The annual frequency data is reported in financial
year format (1 April to 31 March) and includes information on the opening balance,
funds made available at the start of the fiscal year, and expenditure incurred over the
year. While data on SGRY is from the year of its implementation in 2001 to its last
operational financial year 2007-08, data on NREGA starts from 2006-07 to 2010-11.23
Next, we use district-level wage data on agricultural activities as reported by the Agri-
cultural Wages of India (AWI). The monthly frequency AWI data is from July 2001 -
June 2011. We use the daily wage rate data for field labor which includes agricultural
22The data is collected from district-level financial statements of SGRY and NREGA from (i) Ministry
of Rural Development (MoRD); (ii) Datanet (India); and (iii) nrega.nic.in.
23The two schemes never co-existed together in a district.
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activities like ploughing, sowing, reaping, and weeding. Since wage rates are repor-
ted separately for men and women, we take the average of male and female wages to
construct our measure of field wages.24
A shortcoming of the monthly AWI wage series is that it often contains missing
data for some of the months. Furthermore, the annual publications of AWI sporadically
exclude data for some districts and states.25 We first improve the signal to noise ratio by
converting the monthly wage series to annual frequency by taking 12-month averages
in the financial year format to match the frequency and the period of the employment
expenditure data. Second, we restrict our attention to a complete balanced panel of 134
districts from 12 major states of India. Hence we have 1340 annual observations. We
deflate both the wage and employment expenditure data to 2001 prices using state-wise
Consumer Price Index for Rural Laborers (CPI-RL) collected by the Labor Bureau,
Government of India. Unless otherwise mentioned, all the variables in the empirical
analysis are in real, per-capita terms.
5.1 Effect of Variability in Expenditure on Wage Increase
To test the first prediction of our theory, we estimate Equation 2 where the subscripts i
and t denote district and year respectively. The dependent variable is agricultural wages
wi,t (in rupees), while expenditure under the program ei,t is a measure of program
provision (also in rupees). Ex-ante, we expect wages to increase as expenditure under
the program increases. For a district, we capture the variability in program provision by
the standard deviation σi of the expenditure incurred over 10 years {ei,2001, . . . ,ei,2010}.
wi,t = β1ei,t +β2(ei,t×σi)+ INREGA+αi+ γt +ξit+βXi,t (2)
Since greater variability in program provision is expected to compress wage in-
creases, we expect the marginal effect of expenditure on wages to decrease as σi in-
creases. That is, we expect the coefficient of interaction β2 to be negative. Among
other controls, αi and γt represent district and year fixed effects respectively; ξit con-
trols for district specific trends; INREGA signifies a change in program regime for a
district from SGRY to NREGA (see footnote 11); and Xi,t represents a vector of other
controls discussed below. The inclusion of district fixed effects is to address potential
endogeneity concerns that may result in biased estimates of β1 and β2 if variations in
program expenditure are correlated with time-invariant district characteristics. By way
24Although AWI reports wages for children as well, we exclude wages reported under children as
most of the observations are missing under this category.
25For example, data for states like Chhattisgarh, Jharkhand, and Uttarakhand is not available before
2005.
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of example, if program expenditure in drought prone districts is high on average, then
β1 and β2 may be spuriously low.
Year fixed effect addresses two main endogeneity concerns. First, it controls for
fluctuations in the size of the EGS at the national level that affect all districts. As vari-
ations in program provision at national level may be arguably endogenous to cyclical
developments, it may lead to spurious estimates due to reverse causation. Secondly,
year fixed effects control for extreme weather events that may increase both ei,t and
σi for all the districts in a year. Failure to control for such aggregate fluctuations may
downward bias the estimates. Similarly, we filter out any changes in wi,t that are as-
sociated with the phase-wise implementation of NREGA using the indicator variable
INREGA which controls for the regime change from SGRY to NREGA.
Next, district specific linear trends address any potential concerns that may arise if
growth in program expenditure is related to how development indicators in a district
evolve over time. Finally, Xi,t is a vector of additional controls that may simultaneously
affect wages and program provision in a district. These include an indicator for state
election-year, the proportion of Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes population in
a district, and the average rainfall (in millimeters) that a district receives in a year
during the rainy season.26 Since the district sizes vary in our panel, we weight all the
regressions by district population. Further, we relax the assumption that within district
observations are independent by clustering standard errors at the district level which
are robust to heteroskedasticity as well.
Column 1 of Table 1 reports the OLS estimates of Equation 2. Although both βˆ1
and βˆ2 have expected signs, both the coefficients are statistically insignificant.27 While
the specification in Equation 2 controls for a host of endogeneity concerns, it is still
susceptible to district-year fluctuations in program expenditure that can be arguably
endogenous. For example, any local shock like natural calamity or conflict may ad-
versely affect the local agricultural labor market and result in higher than expected
EGS expenditure due to an increase in demand for public work.28
Following Bahal (2016), we exploit the fund allocation process of the programs to
check for potentially endogenous expenditure fluctuations by using fund availability as
an instrument for actual expenditure. Due to the fiscal federalism in India, virtually all
of the expenditure under such programs is financed by the central government. This
26We use remote sensed rainfall data from the Tropical Rainfall Measuring Mission (TRMM) satellite.
See Fetzer (2014) for a detailed discussion on the consistency and the quality of TRMM data over any
other remote sensed or ground-based data. We thank Thiemo Fetzer for sharing the rainfall data.
27Note that we do not explicitly control for σi in Equation 2 since it is just a linear combination of
district fixed effects that are already controlled for.
28Drèze (1990) for example discusses a high take up of public employment by laborers under Maha-
rashtra’s EGS during the famine of 1970-73.
28
entails a certain amount of funds that are made available at the start of the fiscal year
for all the districts. However, expenditure during the whole year is not necessarily
restricted by the fund availability since the financial accounts roll over to the next year.
This allows actual expenditure to exceed fund availability (at district level) in case
the demand for work under the program is unusually high. In the event of such over-
expenditure, the central government clears the negative opening balance next year by
making the appropriate releases to (i) meet previous obligations and (ii) make funds
available for the following year.
To measure the degree of under or over utilization of funds, we define utilization
ratio as 100 ∗ ei,t/eai,t where eai,t is the availability of funds for district i in year t. Fig-
ure 10 plots the year-wise utilization ratio for 134 districts. The observations marked
in red show over-utilization while the observations in blue represent under-utilization.
If the under/over utilization of funds is related to the demand for EGS work due to
private labor market conditions, then this may result in biased OLS estimates of Equa-
tion 2. Similarly, error in measuring actual expenditure may attenuate both βˆ1 and
βˆ2 towards zero. To check for such potentially endogenous district-year fluctuations,
we instrument actual expenditure ei,t with fund availability eai,t . In support of instru-
ment validity, Bahal (2016) shows that while factors that determine fund availability
are mostly controlled for in Equation 2, any residual variation in fund availability is
largely pre-determined and supply driven. Bahal further shows that fund availability
is not sensitive to future rainfall shocks. The flexibility to overspend if the need arises
(Figure 10) may explain the absence of any systematic adjustment in fund availability
to anticipated future shocks.
We, therefore, estimate Equation 2 using two-stage least squares where ei,t and
ei,t×σi are respectively instrumented with eai,t and eai,t×σai in the first stage regression
along with the rest of the controls. Here σai is the standard deviation of fund availability
during 2001-2010. Column 2 of Table 1 reports the second stage estimates of the 2SLS
regression.29 As can be seen, both βˆ1 and βˆ2 have expected signs and are statistically
different from zero. Comparing βˆ1 and βˆ2 in columns 1 and 2 suggests OLS estimates
to be biased towards zero.
The coefficient of 1.8× 10−2 for ei,t suggests a wage increase of 4.8% (of the
average wage) computed at mean expenditure e¯ and σi = 0.30 This estimated increase
in wages closely matches the wage increase reported by (Berg et al., 2013; Imbert
and Papp, 2015). However, σi is not equal to zero in reality and instead follows a
29The first stage regression equations (not reported) yield expected estimates where the F-test on
instruments exclusion comfortably exceeds the threshold of 20.
30The average per-capita expenditure is 152 rupees while the average real wage is around 57 rupees
(in 2001 prices).
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Figure 10: Actual Expenditure as a Percent of Fund Availability
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Note: The figure shows the year-wise utilization of funds as a percent of funds made available. The
observations marked in red show over-utilization while the observations in blue represent under-
utilization.
distribution. Hence, we compute the marginal effect of expenditure on wages at the
average (σ¯i ≈ 114 rupees). We find that relative to when σi = 0, the marginal effect of
expenditure on wages contracts by approximately a 31% (to 1.24× 10−2) at σ¯i. This
corresponds to a wage increase of 3.3% (of the average wage) at mean expenditure e¯,
which is 1.5 percentage points lower when σi = 0.
Up to now we have measured variation in program provision for a district by cal-
culating the standard deviation of its entire expenditure series. In reality, however, the
information set of employers in the private labor market is limited to current and past
levels of program provision (expenditure) while this information set is continuously
updated every period. Consequently, we construct an alternative measure of variability
in program provision where σi,t is the standard deviation of program expenditure in
district i and year t using expenditure till year t: {ei,2001, . . . ,ei,t} which is calculated
recursively for t = 2002, . . . ,2010. To incorporate this alternative measure of program
variability, we replace σi with σi,t in Equation 2 to estimate Equation 3.31
wi,t = β1ei,t +β2(ei,t×σi,t)+β3σi,t + INREGA+αi+ γt +ξit+βXi,t (3)
31Note that Equation 3 explicitly controls for σi,t since unlike σi, it is not a linear combination of any
categorical variables.
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Columns 3 and 4 of Table 1 report the OLS and 2SLS estimates of Equation 3.
While the instrument for actual expenditure in column 4 is same as in column 2, the
instrument for σi,t : σai,t is constructed analogously to σi,t but for fund availability.
Similar to the previous set of regressions, we find the OLS estimates to be attenuated
towards zero. The coefficient of ei,t×σi,t in column 4 is significantly less than zero at
90% confidence level and is very comparable in size to the coefficient of interaction in
column 2. Consistent with the hypothesis that variability in program provision should
have no impact on wages at zero expenditure, the coefficient of σi,t is insignificantly
different from zero.32 In column 5 we show that the 2SLS estimation of Equation 3
excluding σi,t makes the interaction term significant at 99% confidence level while
keeping the size of the estimate largely the same. The alleviation of multicollinearity
may explain the reduction in standard error of the interaction term in column 5. Never-
theless, we continue with column 4 as our preferred specification for Equation 3 which
controls for all the base and interacted effects.
The estimates of column 4 suggest that in comparison to the case with σi,t = 0, the
marginal effect of expenditure on wages is approximately 13 percent lower at average
σi,t . The lower compression of wage increases in the 2SLS estimation of Equation 3 re-
lative to Equation 2 can be mostly explained by a smaller mean of σi,t = 55. Given the
scale up of program expenditure due to the implementation of NREGA during the later
half of the sample, σi may over-estimate wage compression since it computes standard
deviation based on the entire expenditure series of a district. In that respect, σi,t may
better reflect the extent of compression since it recursively computes the standard de-
viation of each district for every period. Overall, our results give strong support to the
hypothesis that greater variability in program provision results in greater compression
of wage increases.
5.2 Compression under Low and High Inflation Districts
Next, we test whether the rate of inflation has any influence on the degree of com-
pression. We calculate average Consumer Price Index-Rural Laborer (CPI-RL) for
each district over the 10 years. We then divide the sample of 134 districts between
low inflation and high inflation districts based on whether a district is respectively be-
low or above the median value of the average CPI. Table 2 re-estimates regressions of
columns 1− 4 of Table 1 with the interaction terms estimated separately for low and
high inflation districts.
32Since ∂w∂σ = β2e+β3
∣∣∣∣
e=0
=⇒ β3 = 0.
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Both OLS (column 1) and 2SLS (column 2) estimates of Equation 2 show that
the coefficient of interaction is a few times larger in low inflation districts relative to
high inflation districts. The 2SLS estimates in column 2 imply a compression of wage
increases at approximately 42% and 70% for the high and low inflation sub-samples
respectively.33 However, as explained earlier, the compression of wage increases cal-
culated using σi may be an overestimate.
Columns 3 and 4 respectively report the OLS and 2SLS estimates of Equation 3
with the interaction term estimated separately for low and high inflation sub-samples.
Similar to the previous set of regressions, the coefficient of interaction is around 3
times larger in low inflation districts relative to high inflation districts. Like before,
we calculate the degree of compression by comparing the increase in wages at average
expenditure when σi,t = σ¯i,t relative to when σi,t = 0. The estimates in column 4, our
preferred specification, suggest compression of wage increases at approximately 14%
and 25% for high and low inflation districts respectively.
Hence, in agreement with studies like Elsby (2009) and Stüber and Beissinger
(2010), we find compression of wage increases to be larger when inflation is low.
These results further corroborate the central message of the paper, inconsistent and
variable EGS can result in compression of wage increases in the presence of down-
ward nominal wage rigidity. Further, the degree of compression is more severe when
inflation is low than when inflation is high.
6 Conclusion
In this article, we develop a theoretical model to show that variability in the level of
program provision and the ensuing uncertainty compresses wage increases that oc-
cur due to employment guarantees. Consistent with our theory, we present empirical
evidence to show that greater variability in program provision results in a larger com-
pression of wage increases. Further, we find that compression of wage increases is
more severe in districts where inflation is low relative to where inflation is high.
The study has important policy implications. First, we show that incomplete and
variable program implementation can diminish the increase in wages which results in
an unambiguous welfare loss. This is especially a concern for developing economies
which usually lack proper institutions or political will to implement large-scale pro-
grams. Second, our findings suggest that simply reducing the variability in program
provision, without necessarily increasing the average expenditure, can be welfare en-
33Calculated by comparing wage increase at average expenditure when σi = σ¯i relative to when σi =
0. We calculate σ¯i separately for each sub-sample.
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hancing. These findings are hence very relevant for program design as well as pre-
implementation cost-benefit analysis.
While not a part of this study, a promising area for future research is to understand
how employers and workers expectations about employment guarantees affect labor
market outcomes. This is important if the continued existence of the workfare allevi-
ates uncertainty regarding the level of program provision in the future. Such a revision
in expectations will increase wages simply due to the accompanying decompression of
wage increases. This may provide an alternative explanation to the delayed effect of
employment guarantees on wages that has been noted in the recent empirical literature
on employment guarantees in India.34
34See for example, Berg et al. (2013), Bahal (2016), and Shrivastava (2015) who find wages to in-
crease due to the overall exposure to the workfare as opposed to an immediate increase in wages. Bahal
(2016) suggests the build up of productive capital under public workfare as a possible explanation for
the observed “stock effect”.
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Tables
Table 1: Effect of Variability in Expenditure on Wages
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS 2SLS
ei,t 0.553 1.811∗∗ 1.273∗ 1.981∗∗∗ 1.843∗∗∗
[0.688] [0.860] [0.683] [0.638] [0.680]
ei,t×σi -0.001 -0.005∗∗
[0.002] [0.003]
σi,t -0.004 -0.008
[0.023] [0.031]
ei,t×σi,t -0.004 -0.005∗ -0.006∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.003] [0.002]
District Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1340 1340 1206 1206 1206
Ftest > 20 Yes Yes Yes
All estimates in the table are of the order of magnitude -2. The unit of observation is a district-
year. Data is for 134 districts from 2001-2010. The dependent variable in all the regressions
is real agricultural wage. ei,t is real per-capita expenditure. For a district, σi is the standard
deviation of expenditure incurred over 10 years {ei,2001, . . . ,ei,2010}. While σi,t is the standard
deviation calculated till year t {ei,2001, . . . ,ei,t} for t = 2002, . . . ,2010. In columns 2 and 4 we
use real per-capita fund availability eai,t as instrument for ei,t . σi in column 2 and σi,t in column
4 is respectively instrumented with σai and σai,t . Here σai and σai,t are standard deviation of funds
made availabile calculated analogous to σi and σi,t respectively. Standard errors clustered at
district level are reported in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table 2: Compression under High and Low Inflation
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS 2SLS OLS 2SLS
ei,t 1.554 3.291∗∗ 1.830∗∗ 2.576∗∗∗
[1.017] [1.285] [0.763] [0.688]
Low In f lation︷ ︸︸ ︷
ei,t×σi
-0.017∗ -0.029∗∗
[0.009] [0.012]
High In f lation︷ ︸︸ ︷
ei,t×σi
-0.004 -0.010∗∗∗
[0.003] [0.004]
σi,t -0.003 -0.012
[0.022] [0.030]
Low In f lation︷ ︸︸ ︷
ei,t×σi,t
-0.015∗∗ -0.017∗∗∗
[0.006] [0.006]
High In f lation︷ ︸︸ ︷
ei,t×σi,t
-0.005∗ -0.006∗
[0.003] [0.003]
District Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Trend Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Other Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 1340 1340 1340 1340
Ftest > 20 Yes Yes
All estimates in the table are of the order of magnitude -2. The unit of observation is a district-
year. Data is for 134 districts from 2001-2010. The dependent variable in all the regressions
is real agricultural wage. The table re-estimates Table 1 regressions where the interactions of
σi and σi,t with ei,t are now estimated separately for high and low inflation districts. See Table
1 for variable definitions. 2SLS regressions involve the use of same instruments as in Table 1.
Standard errors clustered at district level are reported in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10,∗∗ p < 0.05,∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
The employer’s problem is
max
wt ,lt ,wt+1,lt+1
a(lt− l
2
t
2
)−wt lt +a(lt+1−
l2t+1
2
)−wt+1lt+1
s.t. wt ≤ wt+1
rt+1 can be in one of three ranges.
1. rt+1 ≤ rt
The wages in the two periods will be given by the respective statically optimal
values as the constraint does not bind.
w∗z =
aC
arz+2C
z ∈ {t, t+1}
2. rt < rt+1 ≤ r¯t+1
Here the constraint will bind. So, using wt =
Clt
rt
and wt+1 =
Clt+1
rt+1
, we can write
the employer’s problem as
max
lt ,lt+1
a(lt− l
2
t
2
)−Cl
2
t
rt
+a(lt+1−
l2t+1
2
)−Cl
2
t+1
rt+1
s.t.
Clt
rt
≤ Clt+1
rt+1
The Lagrangian is given by
L = a(lt− l
2
t
2
)−Cl
2
t
rt
+a(lt+1−
l2t+1
2
)−Cl
2
t+1
rt+1
+λ (
Clt+1
rt+1
−Clt
rt
)
F.O.C.
∂L
∂ lt
= a(1− lt)− 2Cltrt −λ
C
rt
= 0
∂L
∂ lt+1
= a(1− lt+1)−2Clt+1rt+1 +λ
C
rt+1
= 0
Complimentary slackness
λ
∂L
∂λ
= λ (
Clt+1
rt+1
−Clt
rt
) = 0
i.e. either λ = 0 and
Clt+1
rt+1
−Clt
rt
> 0 , or λ > 0 and
Clt+1
rt+1
−Clt
rt
= 0
When the constraint binds, i.e. rt+1 > rt , then the second condition will hold.
From the two FOCs
art(1− lt)−2Clt +art+1(1− lt+1)−2Clt+1 = 0 . . .(1)
Using complimentary slackness,
lt+1
rt+1
=
lt
rt
39
Replacing lt+1 in (1) with the above expression, we get
l∗t =
art
a
r2t+1+ r
2
t
rt+1+ rt
+2C
w∗t =
aC
a
r2t+1+ r
2
t
rt+1+ rt
+2C
= w∗t+1
3. r¯t+1 ≤ rt+1
Here the constraint will bind and with the wage in period t+1 fixed at its minimum
value, an increase in the rationing rate in period t+1 will not increase private employ-
ment any further as it has already reached its optimum value. We can obtain this by
maximizing the profit in period t+1 for a fixed wage.
max
lt+1
a(lt+1−
l2t+1
2
)− w¯t lt+1
F.O.C.
l¯t+1 =
a− w¯t
a
At the lower bound of the range [r¯t+1,1], all the labor supply available for private
employment is absorbed i.e. l¯t+1 =
w¯t r¯t+1
C
.
Also, the wage is still the optimal wage as derived in the Range 2.
w¯t =
aC
a
r¯2t+1+ r
2
t
r¯t+1+ rt
+2C
Using the expressions for l¯t+1 and w¯t in the F.O.C., we obtain the expression for r¯t+1
r¯t+1 =
rt(art +C)
art−C
Relaxing the Assumption that Selection into EGS is Independent of
Cost of Working
Let workers with cost of working c lower than a threshold value of c¯ be selected into
EGS for sure. For workers with c > c¯ , let a fraction (1− r) be selected into EGS and
the rest be rationed out. Note that the overall rationing rate is not r but
r(wg− c¯)
wg
.
The labor supply is given by
l =

0 w < c¯
(w− c¯)r
C
c¯≤ w≤ wg
w
C
w > wg
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In the static case, profit maximization by the employer gives us the optimal private
wage w∗1 and private employment l
∗
1 .
w∗1 =
(a− c¯)C
ar+2C
+ c¯
l∗1 =
(a− c¯)r
ar+2C
In the two-period case with the corresponding values of r being rt and rt+1 , we get
w∗t =
(a− c¯)C
aφ(rt ,rt+1)+2C
+ c¯
l∗t =
(a− c¯)rt
aφ(rt ,rt+1)+2C
We can see that as φ(rt ,rt+1)> rt , w∗t < w∗1 and we get the same result as before.
Oligopsony
Now we show the same results for oligopsony.
Employers
There are N identical employers. The profit for employer i is given by
pii = a(li− l2i /2)−wli = a(li− l2i /2)−C(li+ l−i)li
F.O.C.
∂pii
∂ li
= 0
=⇒ a(1− li)−2Cli−Cl−i = 0
For symmetric solution, l−i = (N−1)li
=⇒ a(1− li)−2Cli−C(N−1)li = 0
=⇒ li = aa+C+CN
Therefore,
l∗N0 = Nli =
aN
a+C+CN
w∗N0 =
aCN
a+C+CN
EGS
The inverse labor supply with rationing rate r is
w(l) =
Cl
r
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We just replace C with C/r in the no EGS case to get the results for EGS
l∗N1 =
arN
ar+C+CN
w∗N1 =
aCN
ar+C+CN
Dynamic Model
We will show the analysis only for Range 2 here as the rest is analogous to the
monopsony case. The employer i’s problem is
max
lit ,lit+1
a(lit− l
2
it
2
)−Clit(lit + l−it)
rt
+a(lit+1−
l2it+1
2
)−Clit+1(lit+1+ l−it+1)
rt+1
s.t.
Clt
rt
≤ Clt+1
rt+1
The Lagrangian is given by
L = a(lit− l
2
it
2
)−Clit(lit + l−it)
rt
+a(lit+1−
l2it+1
2
)−Clit+1(lit+1+ l−it+1)
rt+1
+λ (
Clt+1
rt+1
−Clt
rt
)
F.O.C.
∂L
∂ lit
= a(1− lit)− 2Clit +Cl−itrt −λ
C
rt
= 0
∂L
∂ lit+1
= a(1− lit+1)− 2Clit+1+Cl−it+1rt+1 +λ
C
rt+1
= 0
For symmetric solution, l−i = (N−1)li
a(1− lit)− (C+CN)litrt −λ
C
rt
= 0
a(1− lit+1)− (C+CN)lit+1rt+1 +λ
C
rt+1
= 0
From the two FOCs
art(1− lit)− (C+CN)lit +art+1(1− lit+1)− (C+CN)lit+1 = 0 . . .(1)
Using the complimentary slackness,
lt+1
rt+1
=
lt
rt
Replacing lt+1 in (1) with the above expression, we get
l∗t =
arN
a
r2t + r
2
t+1
rt + rt+1
+C+CN
w∗t =
aCN
a
r2t + r
2
t+1
rt + rt+1
+C+CN
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∴ w∗N1 > w∗t > w∗N0
Proof of Lemma 1
When the rationing rate is fixed, rt = rt+1 = r, then optimal wages are given by w∗t =
w∗t+1 =
aC
ar+2C
= w. Now, let there be some probability of the rationing rate in the
second period being higher or lower than r, while still keeping the expected rationing
rate at r.
P[rt+1 = r+ x] = P[rt+1 = r− x] = p
Let wt+1 in the cases where rt+1 is r− x, r and r+ x be denoted by w′t+1, w′′t+1 and
w′′′t+1 respectively.
The profit function in terms of wage and rationing rate is given by
pi(w,r) = a(
wr
C
− w
2r2
2C2
)− w
2r
C
The sum of current and future expected profit is given by
Π= pi(wt ,r)+ ppi(w′t+1,r− x)+(1−2p)pi(w′′t+1,r)+ ppi(w′′′t+1,r+ x)
Now let the wage in the first period be fixed at the statically optimum level w∗1.
Now, w′t+1 is independent of wt since the rationing rate is lower. w
′′
t+1 = wt , since the
rationing rate is the same. Also, w′′′t+1 = wt , since the rigidity will bind and the wage
will not be lowered beyond w. Hence,
Π
∣∣
wt=w∗1
= pi(wt ,r)+ ppi(w′t+1,r− x)+(1−2p)pi(wt ,r)+ ppi(wt ,r+ x)
Now we differentiate Π with respect to wt . Since w∗1 is the statically optimal wage
at rationing rate r, therefore,
∂pi(wt ,r)
∂wt
∣∣∣∣
wt=w∗1
= 0.
∂Π
∂wt
∣∣∣∣
wt=w∗1
= p
∂pi(wt ,r+ x)
∂wt
∣∣∣∣
wt=w∗1
=
p(r+ x)
C2
(a(C−w∗1(r+ x))−2w∗1C)
Using w∗1 =
aC
ar+2C
, we get
∂Π
∂wt
∣∣∣∣
wt=w∗1
=− pa
2x(r+ x)
C(ar+2C)
< 0 ∀p,x > 0
Hence, the dynamically optimal wage will be lower than the statically optimal wage.
QED.
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Proof of Proposition 2
The sum of current profit and future expected profit when rt = m is given by
Π(wt ,rt ,x) = pi(wt , l(wt ,rt))+
1
2x
(
r′(wt)∫
rt−x
pi(w∗t+1, l(w
∗
t+1,r1))dr1
+
r′′(wt)∫
r′(wt)
pi(wt , l(wt ,r2))dr2+
rt+x∫
r′′(wt)
pi(wt , lmax(wt))dr3)
At optimal wage w∗t , the derivative of Π with respect to wt is zero. Ignoring rt for
now, we write the optimal wage as a function of x, which is proportional to the standard
deviation.
Πwt (w∗t (x),x) = 0
Using the implicit function theorem, we obtain the derivative of the optimal wage
with respect to x in terms of the double differential and the cross differential of Π
dw∗t
dx
=− Π
wtx
Πwtwt
We know that Πwtwt will be negative at the profit maximizing value w∗t . Hence to
show that
dw∗t
dx
< 0, we need to show that Πwtx < 0.
We obtain the expression for Πwtx as
Πwtx =
15awtC−10w2t C−6a2C+6awtrt(a−wt)
12a2x2wt
As the denominator is always positive, we only consider the numerator. Using
Lemma 1, we know that for any level of uncertainty, w∗t <w∗1 =
aC
art +2C
. This implies,
rt <
aC−2wtC
awt
. Since wt < a, the multiplier of rt is positive in the expression and we
can replace rt with
aC−2wtC
awt
to get an expression which is always larger than the
numerator of Πwtx. Again using wt < a, we show that this expression is negative,
implying that the numerator is also negative.
Numerator(Πwtx)< wtC(2wt−3a)< 0
QED.
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